Strikes

The issues

The recent negotiations and threat of a strike of Britain's firefighters raises the interesting question of when workers have the right to organize and to strike. There are many sources from Jewish law and tradition that can help us answer this question.

The Jewish Perspective

THE STATUS OF TRADE UNIONS
Trade unions are hardly a new phenomenon. Guilds and other formal trade associations have existed for thousands of years, with much the same goals as they have today: improving working conditions for members and the level of service to the public.

The approach of Jewish tradition to these organizations is generally favourable. Jewish law acknowledges the right of members of a particular trade to organise together into a guild or union. In fact, such a union is granted the status of a kind of community, including limited authority to regulate wage rates and working conditions. (Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 231:28.)

While economics teaches us to be wary of unions and other monopolies, this suspicion should not blind us to their possible advantages. The fact that members of a trade naturally tend to be in a state of competition and rivalry does create some advantages for the consumer, but it may also prevent some kinds of collaboration that would benefit the public as a whole. So encouraging guilds or unions may lead to a better balance between the poles of cooperation and competition. It also has an important human element, encouraging solidarity among fellow tradesmen who might otherwise be riven apart by business rivalry.

This mini-community model was well developed in Jewish life. In many Jewish communities members of a particular profession had their own communal organisations such as a synagogue, mutual aid society, and so on. A large European town might have had a "Schneiders' shul" (tailors' synagogue), "Schechters' shul" (slaughterers' synagogue) and so on.

Of course there is an obvious problem with such a union: unions are a kind of monopoly, carrying with it the danger of stifling competition and progress. One solution provided by Jewish law is to give the rabbinical leadership authority to annul trade decisions and rules that are clearly against the public interest. The Talmud gives an example of the tanners of a particular town who decided to reduce supply and drive up prices by dividing work between them according to days of the week. According to the agreement, each tanner would work only three days out of seven; as an enforcement measure, if he were caught working on a forbidden day, his hides would be torn up. The great communal leader Rava decided that this agreement was unreasonable and contrary to the interests of the public and he nullified it. (Bava Batra 9a.)

We can summarize the approach of Jewish law to unions by stating that workers have a legitimate right to organize for their mutual advantage but a balance has to be held between the interests of the community and the interests of the members of the union. While the private interests of unions may sometimes not harmonise with the interests of consumers, this negative economic impact is lessened by the authority of communal rabbinical leadership to nullify certain decisions. In general, intervention was generally justified only in extreme cases, in order not to interfere with the right of workers to organise and in order to reap the human benefits of solidarity among fellow members of a trade.

STRIKES

Since unions have the right to regulate wages and working conditions, it follows that if the strike is a private matter of negotiations between the workers and the employer (or customer), there is no inherent ethical problem in striking. Just as an individual may decide that he is not willing to work for a particular wage, so may a union make such a decision. All that is necessary is for the union to be a legitimately formed body representing the membership, and for the decision to strike to be made in an appropriate way with the approval of the majority of the union members. In 1951, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein wrote, "I don't see any kind of prohibition against an ordinary workers' union, one which makes binding regulations and wage scales; prevents the employer from excluding them; and obligates all members to participate in strikes and other actions for the mutual benefit". (Igrot Moshe CM I 58)

However, there are many common situations where other factors are at stake; in these cases a strike cannot be viewed as merely a negotiating tool.

One example is the case where terms of a contract have already been agreed. Striking as a means of changing those terms while they are still operative obviously calls into question whether the workers originally negotiated in good faith. Re-opening negotiations would be justified only if there were new circumstances that the sides never considered when they made the original contract or if the term of the original contract had expired.

For example, Rabbi Yosef Molko discusses a slaughterers' union in the early 19th century, which traditionally slaughtered a fixed proportion of cows and chicken and were paid according to the number of cows they slaughtered. When economic and demographic changes led to a great increase in the proportion of chicken consumed in their city, they ended up performing more work for less pay, and Rabbi Molko confirms their right to strike even though fundamentally their original work agreement was still in force. The justification is the unforeseen circumstances, which make the original conditions unfair. (Ohel Yosef Sechirut 6, cited in Shilem Warhaftig Dinei Avoda II p. 979.)

Another problematic example would be the case of a strike of some kind of essential service, which would cause harm not only to the employer but also to the public at large. Rabbi Feinstein relates a case of a strike by Torah instructors in a Yeshiva. Due to the supreme value of Torah study in our tradition, disruption of such study among school-age pupils is viewed with the utmost gravity, and can definitely be considered an example of a strike in an essential service. He concludes that such a strike cannot be justified merely to improve working conditions, but is proper in the case where salaries are below subsistence level. In this case, states Rabbi Feinstein, the interests of the teachers and the institution are not really opposed. Rather, it is in the interest of all parties to create a situation where salaries are sufficient to maintain a functioning school. (Igrot Moshe CM I 59.)

In other words, wages that are below subsistence levels may be in the interest of the employer in the short run, because employees are "over a barrel" - they are to some extent locked in to their jobs. But in the long run, such wages may work against the workplace as a whole; attrition will occur and no properly qualified replacement will be forthcoming. In this case a strike may actually have the effect of rejuvenating the workplace, rather than damaging it.

An article by Rabbi Kasriel Tchursh states that strikes in vital services can never be permitted, and that in these cases the dispute must be referred to arbitration. ("Dinei HaShevita BeHalakha", Shana beShana 1963 pp. 24-26, cited in Aaron Levine, Free Enterprise and Jewish Law, p. 19.) And Rav Kook wrote that if an employer doesn't agree to arbitration then a strike would be justified in order to compel him to submit to arbitration. (Cited in Shilem Warhaftig, "Dinei Avoda beMishpat HaIvri".)

There is no real contradiction between these views. All agree that strikes are not the proper and ethical way to settle wage disputes in vital services. Rather, arbitration should determine appropriate and fair work conditions in the case of a dispute. But if the employer doesn't agree to such intervention, workers would be entitled to strike if such an action was necessary for the long-term viability of these services.

APPLICATION TO CURRENT EVENTS

We can readily apply these insights to the plight of the firefighters, who certainly provide a vital emergency service. First of all, the fundamental right of these skilled workers to organize and bargain for favourable working conditions is certainly acknowledged. Second of all, given the vital nature of the service they perform, a strike should be considered a last resort measure for attaining these goals. Rather, the union should press for an impartial forum in which their demands would be given appropriate consideration.

A strike would be justified only if the employment authority refused to convene such a forum or to abide by its conclusions; or alternatively, if wages are so low that if allowed to continue they would lead to an unacceptable deterioration in services due to the inability to find sufficient manpower.